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Vardges Hovhannisyan






The objective  of our research is to investigate  retailer  market conduct in the sale of 
beverage milk  using  a structural  model of consumer  behavior  and retailer  optimality  conditions 
that embrace a range of competitive  scenarios. The study is based on an aggregate  level  analysis 
of retailer  behavior  with milk  quantity  used as a strategic  variable. 
  We contribute  to the literature  by employing  a Generalized  Quadratic Almost  Ideal 
Demand System (GQAIDS) to model milk  demand. Furthermore,  we derive the retailer 
optimality  conditions  that incorporate the slopes of inverse  GQAIDS demand curves for the 
products under study. Lastly,  we apply this generalized  structural  model to study the retailer 
behavior  in marketing  national  brand (NB) and private  label (PL) milk.   
  The market in question  is rather concentrated  at the downstream  level;  however we 
believe   that the retailer  behavior  is most consistent  with a competitive  atmosphere.  Moreover, 
the results support the conjecture  that retailers  mainly  use the leading  NB milk  to assure some 
store traffic  while  utilizing  PL brands for rent extraction. 
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1.  Introduction 
The retail  competitive  landscape in the U.S. has been undergoing  significant  changes  in 
recent years. This is reflected  in food marketing  system becoming  increasingly  concentrated  in 
downstream  channels  for the most part, with retailers  having  their market share increased from 
16 to 36 percent over the past three decades (U.S. Government  Accountability  Office).  Despite 
potential  gains  from  the economies  of scale, some fear that rising  retail  concentration  might 
translate  into an exercise  of market power on the retail  end. Furthermore,  retailers  have been 
offering  a wide range of increasingly  differentiated  products in an attempt to shift  the demand for 
their offerings  outward or, perhaps rotate the demand curve to make it more inelastic(Martinez, 
2007). Finally,  with the emergence  of some strong store brands/private  labels (PL) major 
retailers  have become more flexible  not only in their dealings  with  national  brand manufacturers, 
but against  their rival  chains  on the horizontal  landscape as well  (Berges-Sennou  et al., 2003).   
In theory, the above factors may reinforce  each other in empowering  the retailers. 
Whether this translates  into an exercise of market  power, however, remains  more of an empirical 
question  that needs to be studied  in certain  contexts and for specific  products.  We choose to 
study retailer  conduct in milk  marketing  given  the implications  of retail  empowerment  for final 
consumers  and food producers/farmers  as well. The importance  of the matter is exemplified  by 
the joint hearings  in 2010 initiated  on the part of the USDA and the Department  of Justice  with 
the aim of gaining a clear understanding of the competitive atmosphere in the U.S. dairy industry.  
The objective  of this study is to investigate  the retailer  market conduct using  a structural 
model of consumer  and retailer  market behavior.  More specifically,  we rely on a neoclassical 
demand system to model consumer  behavior;  meanwhile  allowing  the retailer  optimality 
conditions  to embrace a range of competitive  scenarios extending  from perfect competition  to the 4 
 
retail  cartel. These structural  models were first  developed to study markets for homogeneous 
goods and laid the ground for New Empirical  Industrial  Organization  (NEIO) literature  (see for 
example  Bresnahan,  1982; Lau, 1982). This  approach is in line  with conjectural  variation 
analysis  and, in principle,  can be applied to a differentiated  goods market. Conjectural  variation 
or conduct parameter represents the collective  response of the competitor  firms  to a unitary 
change in the own quantity  produced, as perceived by a given  firm  (Bowley,  1924). With proper 
specification,  these parameters allow modeling  various  oligopoly  scenarios  and represent the 
degree of competitiveness  in the market (Dixit,  1986). Unlike  the Structure-Conduct-
Performance approach, whose primary  concern was accounting  for the sources of market power 
based on an assumption  that  some measures  of market power were readily  available  (mainly 
from accounting  data), the NEIO estimates  market power. The underlying  reason for modeling 
market power is that firm  marginal  cost functions  are rarely observable  as opposed to retail 
prices, while  some of the cost components  may be used to infer  price over marginal  cost 
markups (Perloff  et al., 2007). 
Hyde and Perloff  (1998) extend the early structural  framework  to embrace differentiated 
products, based on a Linear Approximate  Almost  Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS) 
specification  of demand and corresponding  retailer  optimality  conditions.  While  an important 
early contribution  to the NEIO literature  and driven  mostly  by computational  ease, the use of the 
LA/AIDS is restrictive  in several  ways. First of all, it ignores  a potential  pre-committed  demand 
component  (that is insensitive  to variations  in economic  factors) and may result  in unreliable 
demand parameter estimates  whenever  the pre-committed  demand is present. Secondly, it 
assumes a linear  relationship  between the budget shares and logarithm  of total expenditures, 
which  is not guaranteed  in empirical  applications  (Banks et al., 1997).  5 
 
We contribute  to the literature  by employing  a Generalized  Quadratic Almost  Ideal 
Demand System (GQAIDS) to model milk  demand.  This addresses potential  issues discussed 
earlier  that relate to the use of restrictive  demand models. Furthermore,  we derive the retailer 
optimality  conditions  that incorporate the slopes of inverse  GQAIDS demand curves for the 
products under study. Lastly,  we apply this generalized  structural  model to study the retailer 
behavior  in marketing  national  brand (NB) and private  label (PL) milk. 
The market in question  is rather concentrated  at the downstream  level,  however we 
receive that the retailer  behavior  is most consistent  with a competitive  atmosphere.  Moreover, 
the results support the conjecture  that retailers  use leading  NB milk  to assure store traffic  while 
utilizing  the PL brands for rent extraction. 
The remainder  of the study is organized  as follows.  Section two discusses the 
methodological  background of the paper by presenting  the GQAIDS demand model and 
corresponding  retailer  optimality  conditions.  Section three offers  a brief description  of the 
product-level  data used for the aggregate-level  analysis.  Empirical  results  from the generalized 
structural  model are presented next.  The final  section concludes.  Lastly,  optimality  conditions 
underlying  the behavioral  underpinnings  of retailers  are derived in the Appendix. 
 
2.  Methodology 
In this manuscript  we study the market conduct of major retail  chains  in a Midwestern 
U.S. city using  weekly product-level  data on milk  disappearance.  We employ  a structural 
framework  with  certain behavioral  assumptions  underlying  milk  supply and demand. 
Specifically,  milk  demand is modeled via a neoclassical  demand system and supply equations 
represent retailer  optimal  decisions.  Our methodological  contribution  is that we generalize  the 
milk  demand using  the GQAIDS specification  and derive the respective  retailer  optimality 6 
 
conditions  which  include  the slopes of inverse  GQAIDS demands for a variety  of milk  types 
included  in this analysis. 
 
The Structure of Milk Demand 
Milk demand is modeled  via the GQAIDS demand specification.  This extends the 
previous  literature  which  relied upon the LA/AIDS model of demand to explore the retailer 
market behavior  (Hyde and Perloff,  1998). The rationale  for using  the GQAIDS model is that it 
offers the most flexibility  and generality  of nested AIDS models. More specifically,  the results 
from the more restrictive  demand models will  be biased if the pre-committed  component  of 
demand is not accounted for, or alternatively,  if the milk  budget shares are restricted to be 
linearly  related to the logarithm  of total expenditure. 
Price independent  generalized  logarithmic  (PIGLOG) preferences  underlie  the GQAIDS 
model of demand, which  allows  for modeling  a potential  pre-committed  component  of demand.
3 
In addition,  the expenditure  share Engel curves are allowed to depend on the quadratic logarithm 
of income  (Deaton and Muellbauer,  1980;  Bollino,  1987; Banks et al., 1997). Consumer 
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s = m - t p  is the supernumerary  expenditure,  m is the total  expenditure  on a group  of 
products under  study, 
n
ii i=1
tp  is defined  as the pre-committed  expenditure,  with  i t  
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4 The utility function must be specified in stochastic terms in order for the Roy’s identity to yield the error terms (i.e. 
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parameterizing  the pre-committed  demand of the product i.  In addition,  ln (P) and b(p) are the 
translog  and Cobb-Douglass price aggregator  functions,  respectively,  with 
n n n
0 j j ij j i j=1 j=1 i=1
ln(P) = ʱ + ʱ  ln(p )+0.5 γ  ln(p ) ln(p )     and    
n n β k
ll k l=1 k=1
b(p)= p =exp β ln(p )   . 
Here  j p  is the price of the
th
j commodity, and  i ij i ʱ , γ ,β are parameters.  
Aggregation,  homogeneity  and symmetry  restrictions  stemming  from consumer theory 
are represented by
n n n n
i i i ij ij ji i=1 i=1 i=1 j=1
ʱ =1, β =0, λ 0, γ =0, and γ =γ j i        , respectively. 
Uncompensated  budget share equations  are then obtained via Roy’s identity: 
2 n
i i i
i i ij j i
j=1
tp λ s s s
 w = + ʱ + γ ln(p )+β ln + ln (2)
m m P b(p) P
      
     
      
  
Consumer  demographic  characteristics  ( j D ) may be incorporated into (2) via 
demographic  translating  of the pre-committed  quantities  as follows  (Pollak and Wales, 1981): 
d
i i0 ij j j=1
t = t + t D (3)      
An important  benefit  of the Generalized  AIDS models as opposed to the AIDS demand is 
that demographic  translating  assures invariance  of elasticity  estimates  to the scale of data (Alston 
et al., 2001). 
Uncompensated   
M
ij ε   and expenditure  elasticity  i (ξ) estimates are computed via the 
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Where  ij δ is the Kronecker delta. 
 
Retailer Optimality Conditions 
The retail  sector is rather concentrated  in the market under study, therefore  we allow for a 
range of possible equilibria  in an oligopolistic  environment  with  the perfect competition  and 
retail  cartel being  two extreme  scenarios.
5 This is performed by equating  respective retailer 
effective  marginal  revenues and  marginal  cost functions  as follows  (Bresnahan, 1982; Hyde and 
Perloff, 1998):
n j
i i j i i j=1
i
p





Where  ii m c (q ) represents the retailer marginal  cost function
6,  and  i λ [0,1]  measures the level of 
competition  in a given  retail market. The latter is also known as a conjectural  variation  or 
conduct parameter in the spirit of the NEIO literature,  which  represents a given firm’s  perception 
of its competitive  surrounding.  More specifically,  the conjectural  variation  parameter represents 
the aggregate  response of the rivals  to a unitary  change in  a firm’s  control  variable  as perceived 
by the latter (Bowley,  1924). With proper specification  these parameters  allow for modeling 
                                                                 
5 The equilibrium  concept here is assumed to be Nash in quantities (i.e., Cournot). 
6 Retailers are assumed to have an identical marginal cost function, which allows for studying  retailer market 
conduct at an aggregate-level. 9 
 
various  oligopoly  scenarios  and represent the degree of competitiveness  in the market (Dixit, 
1986). A  value  of zero implies  perfect competition,  while  a value  of one signifies  a cartel 
functioning  on a horizontal  competitive  landscape.  Infinitely  many  oligopolistic  scenarios fall 
between these two polar cases. 
   From a game theoretic  perspective,  however only  certain values  of  λ can be substantiated 
by meaningful  economic theories, namely  Bertrand, Cournot, and collusion.  Therefore, some 
studies refrain  from game-theoretic  interpretation  of λ , and model it as a gap between price and 
marginal  cost that can be used to obtain the Lerner index of price over marginal  cost markup. 
i i i i
i
ii
p -m c λ Q p'(q ) λ
L =- - (7)
pp ε
  
This interpretation  of  λ is also not immune  to criticism.  Particularly,  it is argued that  λ estimates 
are unbiased if it is modeled to represent behavior resulting  from conjectural  variations 
equilibrium  (Corts, 1998). 
The structural  model of retailer market behavior is then represented by a system of 
equations (2), (6), and theoretical  restrictions  from the neoclassical  demand model. However, to 
have an estimable  system of behavioral  equations we need to specify a marginal  cost function, 
and obtain the slopes of the inverse demand curves, i.e.  ji pq  . Following  Hyde and Perloff 
(1998), we adopt constant marginal  cost structure  that is determined  by wholesale  milk  price i (v ) , 
and retail wages (w):   
i i i mc (q )=a  bv dw                                                                 (8)   
An important  assumption  underlying  the optimality  conditions  is that retailers carry all 
the products covered in this study. We derive  ji pq  for the GQAIDS demand model and 
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We apply the generalized  structural  model of retailer  market power to the milk  market in a 
Midwestern  U.S. city-market. 
 
3.  Data  
The choice of the market is justified  by the high  level  of retail  concentration  throughout 
the period under study. Specifically,  three major retail  chains  accounted for over 60% of the 
total market share in our study market.
7 This makes it an interesting  setting for testing  the 
relationship  between the market concentration  and the retailer behavior, provided that Wall-
Mart had a small  presence in the entire period in question (less than 5 % total market share). 
The product-level  weekly data from 2001 to 2006 on milk purchase volumes  and 
respective value of sales are provided by the Information  Resources Incorporated (IRI). We 
define three groups of products, namely  milk  by a leading  NB manufacturer,  the fringe  NB 
manufacturers  collectively,  and PL milk.
8  Three retail chains operating  in the market are covered 
in the analysis,  two of which are major players in the retail  sector. It should be mentioned, 
                                                                 
7 The biggest player alone was responsible for around 35 % of the total market share (Market Scope, various years). 
8 We observe that all the retailers carry both the leading and fringe NB milk in our data, which does not hold for PL 
milk 11 
 
however, that the IRI dataset only  covers two of the three leading  retail  chains  in the IRI city in 
analysis.  Aggregating  products across retailers  results  in 312 observations  (six years, each 
comprising  52 weeks). 
An important  assumption  underlying  the analysis  is that various  store brands are 
identical;  which  allows us to aggregate  PL milk  across retailers.  However, this may be an 
abstraction  from the reality  provided that store brands may well  be perceived as distinct  products 
by some consumers  (even though  certain  PL brands of milk  may have been produced by the 
same manufacturer).   
Table 1 Weekly descriptive  statistics  for products defined 
Product\Variable  Quantity  (1000* Pints)  Price (Cents/pints)  Market share (%) 
 
Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
Leading  NB  51.1  10.5  44.3  2.1  8.0  1.0 
Private Label  780.2  175.6  31.4  3.9  84.9  2.2 
Fringe  NB  34.8  13.0  58.7  9.9  7.1  2.3 
Source: Information Resources Incorporated, years 2001-06. 
It is worth noting  that PLs are the most prevalent  milk/products  in the market (Table 1). 
Specifically,  they comprise  about 85 % of the total market share, with  the remaining  share 
accruing  to milk  by different  NB manufacturers.  This makes PL milk  an important  strategic  tool 
for retailers,  given  that store brands are immune  to inter and intra-brand  competition  (Steiner, 
2004). Meanwhile,  the PL milk  constitutes  the cheapest option (31.4 cents per pint) followed  by 
milk  by fringe  NB (58.7 cents) and leading  NB (44.3 cents). Because of aggregation,  the 
difference  in container  sizes may be just one factor accounting  for price differentials.  Another 
important  factor that we observe in data is that the fringe  NB mostly  offered  specialty  products, 
such as organic  and lactose free milk.   12 
 
The IRI dataset was supplemented  by data on retailer  cost components,  namely  a proxy 
for wholesale  level  milk  prices (Announced  Class I Coop prices) and average wages for 
employees  from  the market in question.
9   
 
4.  Empirical  results  
For estimation  of our empirical  model we use the GAUSSX module  of the GAUSS 
software system.  We include  a system of GQAIDS demand equations  given  by (2) with 
respective  theoretical  restrictions  of aggregation,  homogeneity,  and symmetry,  and retailer 
optimality  conditions  represented by equations  in (9). On the account of adding-up  restriction, 
one demand equation  was excluded  from estimation  to avoid overidentification.  The parameter 
estimates  for the omitted  equation  are obtained from  the theoretical  restrictions  imposed on the 
model.  
The estimates  of 24 structural  parameters, including  theλ's are estimated  via the BHHH 
algorithm  (Table 2). The model provides an extremely  good fit to the data as all parameter 
estimates  were found to be statistically  significant  (except for the  λ for the leading  NB milk)  at 
the one percent level of significance  (only 2 b is  significant  at five percent level).  This result is 
highly  supported by an overall  goodness of fit test.
10 
Therefore, it appears that the GQAIDS model is the correct demand specification, 
provided that the estimates  of pre-committed  demand components  and those of parameters 
representing  the effect of quadratic logarithmic  expenditures  are statistically  significant. 
                                                                 
9 Data on wages were collected from the official  website of BLS,  and the Announced Class I Coop prices came from 
the Dairy Markets website (AAE Department, UW-Madison) 
10 Test statistic value is 1999.4 and the critical 
2 χ with 24 degrees of freedom is 42.9  (at the 99 % confidence level) 13 
 
Alternatively,  we could perform a likelihood  ratio tests for pre-committed  demand, using 
estimates  from the GQAIDS and GAIDS, and those from GQAIDS and QAIDS for quadratic 
logarithmic  expenditures.  Thus, the results  from the previous  research studies  may not be very 
reliable  from this perspective,  and whenever  possible,  the most general  formulation  of the nested 
AIDS models  must be used. 
The estimates  of  1 2 3 λ , λ , λ parameters are of central importance  in this study, as they 
delineate  the retailer  market conduct for the milk  products. The estimate  for milk  by a leading 
NB 1 (i.e., λ) is insignificant  both economically  and statistically.  On the other hand, retailers 
seemed to have received economic profits from the PLs and milk by fringe  NB, since  23 λ , λ are 
statistically  significant.  However, the latter are rather small  in value, indicating  that the nature of 
the retail competition  on the horizontal  landscape has been most consistent  with the perfect 
competition  scenario. Anecdotal evidence suggests  that despite a small  presence of Wall-Mart 
supercenters in the market, its entry heralded an era of intense competition  among the two major 
retail chains. 
We also present uncompensated  and expenditure  elasticity  estimates  (Table 3). The vast 
majority  of these estimates  are statistically  significant,  and all of these measures are consistent 
with consumer  theory. Own price elasticity  for the PL milk  is almost unitary  elastic (-1.08), with 
those for both types of NB milk  being rather elastic (-1.44 and -1.97, respectively).  It is worth 
noting  that milk by the fringe  NB manufacturers  is mostly specialty  milk, such as organic and 
lactose free. As shown by other studies, consumers  are most price-sensitive  towards these 
products.
11This  speaks to the fact that retailers  may have more latitude  in charging  higher 
markups for PL milk  as opposed to the NB milk. In fact, at the bottom of Table 2 we evidence 
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the highest  markup, as measured by the Lerner Index, accruing  to the PL milk  (3.41 %), which  is 
followed  by the fringe  NB milk  (3.13 %) and the leading  NB milk  manufacturer  (zero markup). 
One interpretation  of the estimated  values  of  λ's  is that retail  chains  may use some leading  NB 
milk  to assure certain level  of store traffic,  while  PL milk  are used to extract rents from the 
customers  (especially  given  the huge market share of the PL milk).  This is in line  with an 
extensive  literature,  according  to which  retailers  may use the PLs strategically  both vertically  and 
against  their  rival  chains,  given  that PLs are immune  to inter and intra-brand  competition 
(Berges-Sennou  et al., 2003; Steiner, 2004). 
Another interesting  finding  that emerges  is that the leading  NB and fringe  NB milk  are 
important  substitutes  based on the cross-price effects,  and while  the PL milk  demand is rather 
sensitive  to the leading  NB milk  prices, the demand for the latter is completely  unresponsive  to 
variations  in the PL milk  price. This  maybe due to the fact that retailers  maintain  PL milk  price 
at a reasonably  low level  so that even for a given  rise in the PL price NB milk  is still  an 
expensive  substitute. 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The objective  of this manuscript  is to investigate  the retailer  market conduct in the U.S. 
milk  market using  a structural  model of consumer  behavior  and retailer  optimality  conditions 
that embrace a range of competitive  scenarios. The study is based on an aggregate  level  analysis 
with the retailer  equilibrium  behavior  assumed  to be Cournot-Nash in milk  quantity. 
  We contribute  to the literature  by employing  a Generalized  Quadratic Almost  Ideal 
Demand System (GQAIDS) to model milk  demand. Furthermore,  we derive the retailer 
optimality  conditions  that incorporate the slopes of inverse  GQAIDS demand curves for the 15 
 
products under study. Lastly,  we apply this generalized  structural  model to study the retailer 
behavior  in marketing  national  brand (NB) and private  label (PL) milk.   
  The market in question  is rather concentrated  at the downstream  level,  however we 
receive that the retailer  behavior  is most consistent  with a competitive  atmosphere.  Moreover, 
the results support the conjecture  that retailers  mainly  use the leading  NB milk  to assure some 
store traffic  while  utilizing  PL brands for rent extraction. 
The importance  of the current study can not be underestimated.  It offers  an understanding 
of retailer  market conduct with no access to very detailed  data and brand-level  analysis.  It also 
brings  in more information  as opposed to studies  treating  milk  as a homogeneous  good, provided 
that retailers  may be using  PL and NB products differently. 
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Table 2 Estimation  results  and Lerner Indices  across products 
Parameters  Estimate  S. E. 
Demand model     
1  t   0.033**  0.006 
2  t   -3.783**  0.131 
3  t   0.005**  0.001 
1  z   0.032**  0.001 
2  z   -0.009**  0.000 
3  z   -0.023**  0.001 
1  ʱ   0.120**  0.009 
2  ʱ   1.253**  0.001 
3  ʱ   -0.373**  0.009 
11  γ   -0.053**  0.004 
12  γ   0.007**  0.002 
13  γ   0.045**  0.003 
22  γ   -0.048**  0.002 
23  γ   0.040**  0.001 
33  γ   -0.085**  0.004 
Marginal  cost function     
1  a   2.181**  0.096 
2  a   -9.221**  1.888 
3  a   13.557**  1.080 
1  b   0.005**  0.002 
2  b      0.074*  0.039 
3  b   0.057**  0.009 
1  d   -0.103**  0.005 
2  d   0.455**  0.115 
3  d   -0.820**  0.066 
Market power     
1  λ      0.001  0.001 
2  λ   0.037**  0.002 
3  λ   0.062**  0.003 
Lerner Index (%)     
Leading  NB milk  0   
PL milk  3.41   
Fringe  NB milk  3.13   
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % level of  
significance, respectively. Standard errors appear in italic. The bottom part  represents the  
own-price elasticity adjusted Lerner Index Estimates. 19 
 
Table 3 Structural  Model Uncompensated  and Expenditure  Elasticity  Estimates 
Product  Leading  NB  Private Label  Fringe  NB  Expenditure   
Leading  NB  -1.442***          0.268*  0.324*       0.850*** 
        0.235  0.162  0.186  0.089 
Private Label        0.012       -1.080***        0.051***        1.017*** 
        0.012  0.009  0.006  0.005 
Fringe  NB    0.354***  0.652       -1.975***  0.969 
 
      0.143  1.054  0.277  1.166 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % level of significance, res- 














, and plug them in (6). For that purpose, we differentiate  both 
sides of (2) and set them equal to each other.  
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Plugging  all the derivatives  back into the derivative  of the RHS in the right  order we get: 
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Equating  the derivatives  of both sides gives  us the following: 
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After rearranging  we get: 
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Similarly  i E is the right hand side of (11) divided by m. Thus, the slopes of inverse  GQAIDS 











Finally,  after plugging  the slopes of inverse  demands back into the retailer  optimality  conditions, 
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